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MARITAIN ON "THE COMMON GOOD": 
REFLECTIONS ON THE CONCEPT 
Kibujjo M. KALUMBA 
ABSTRACT: Two major theses underly Maritain's position in The Person And The Common Good: 
the thesis that society is whole, and the thesis that, as persons, humans are not parts of, but 
wholes within, society. In light of these, he criticizes three major approaches to the common 
good: individualism, communism, and totalitarianism, and proposes an alternative candidate 
for the concept. To this candidate I propose a succinct characterization which I show to have 
universal as well as ecclesiastical significance. 
RÉSUMÉ: L'auteur examine les deux thèses de Maritain dans La personne et le bien commun: que 
la société est un tout; et que les personnes humaines n'en sont pas des parties mais sont elles-
mêmes des touts dans la société. Puis l'auteur caractérise et discute l'alternative que propose 
Maritain face aux trois approches qu'il combat: l'individualisme, le communisme, le totalita-
risme. 
INTRODUCTION 
In his The Person And The Common Good1, Jacques Maritain seeks to establish 
an alternative to what he takes to be the three main approaches to the common good, 
conceived of as society's telos.2 These approaches are: "bourgeois individualism", 
1. Jacques MARITAIN, The Person And The Common Good, trans. John J. Fitzgerald (Notre Dame: University 
of Notre Dame Press, 1966). I shall henceforth refer to this book as PCG. 
2. Throughout this paper society's "telos" is used as the single word for society's "purpose", "goal", "end", 
"reason for existence", "good", "function", etc. Maritain seems to use these and related words inter-
changeably. See, especially, PCG, pp. 49-50. In the sense in which Maritain seems to use "the common 
good" in PCG, an approach's common good appears to be whatever that approach takes to be society's 
telos. 
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"communistic anti-individualism", and "totalitarian or dictatorial anti-communism 
and anti-individualism".^ 
Two major theses seem to underly Maritain's critical assessment of the three 
approaches. The first thesis is that society is not a mere collection of individuals; it 
is an ontological whole. The second thesis is that, as persons4, human beings are not 
parts of society; they are wholes within society. 
It is a fundamental thesis of Thomism\ that the person as such is a whole. The 
concept of part is opposed to that of person. To say, then, that society is a whole 
composed of persons is to say that society is a whole composed of wholes.6 
It is in light of the above two theses that Maritain proceeds to evaluate each of 
the three approaches. 1 will begin with his critical assessment of individualism. 
According to individualism, society is an artifact created by humans for the 
exclusive purpose of serving their individual needs.7 Hence, qua society's telos, the 
common good is, for the individualists, nothing but the collection of the particular 
goods of each individual.8 
The individualistic approach is unacceptable to Maritain for at least two reasons. 
First, Maritain seems to urge, individualism fails to do justice to the holistic nature 
of society enunciated by the first thesis. Because it is an ontological whole, society, 
in Maritain's view, has a telos unreducible to the goods of its constituents. Hence, he 
seems to think that, by identifying society's telos with its constituents' goods, indi-
vidualism denies society and unreducible telos and, by doing so, robs it of its holistic 
nature.9 Second, Maritain seems to contend, individualism undermines what he takes 
3. In chapter 5, these approaches are refered to as the "three conflicting forms of social and political 
materialism" (PCG, p. 91). In the "Introductory*1 (chapter 1), the approaches are posed as "opposite" or 
"contrary errors", with bourgeois individualism posed as the extreme opposite of the other two. The 
approaches will henceforth be designated "individualism", "communism", and "totalitarianism", respec-
tively. 
4. Throughout PCG, especially in chapter III, Maritain stresses "the metaphysical distinction between indi-
viduality and personality" (PCG, p. 13). A human being is, for Maritain, an individual in his/her entirety, 
just as s/he is a person in his/her entirety. "There is not in me one reality, called my individual, and another 
/ reality called my person. One and the same reality is, in a certain sense an individual, and, in another 
sense, a person. Our whole being is an individual by reason of that in us which derives from matter, and 
a person by reason of that in us which derives from spirit" (PCG, p. 43). Maritain's view is that it is only 
as a person that a human being is a whole. As an individual s/he is a part, and as such, his/her good is 
inferior to that of society. Such being the case, "|ilt is ... in the nature of things that social life should 
[for the sake of the whole] impose numerous restraints and sacrifices upon his life as a person considered 
as a part of the whole" (PCG, p. 69). This view obviously entails a paradox, something Maritain readily 
acknowledges and tries to wrestle with (PCG, pp. 77-79). 
5. Maritain is a self-acclaimed Thomist. Thus "Thomistic personalism" is the best description he can think 
of for the position he takes in PCG, p. 13. 
6. PCG, pp. 56-57. 
7. Ibid., p. 92. 
8. Ibid., pp. 49-50. 
9. I am rendering explicit a line of reasoning which seems to be implicit in the claim that identifying society's 
telos with the collection of the particular goods of its individuals "would dissolve society as such to the 
advantage of its parts, ..." (PCG, p. 50). 
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to be a duty entailed by the second thesis; "the duty" to treat the person as a whole. 
I will explain. 
Since s/he is a whole, the person, in Maritain's view, ought to be treated as a 
whole.10 Part of treating a person as a whole, Maritain seems to think, consists in 
providing him/her with the necessary requirements for the pursuit of his/her good qua 
person. Due to "the law of superabundance inscribed in the depth of [his/her] being 
...,"" the person, Maritain urges, requires the communion of knowledge and love;12 
a requirement which, in his view, can only be satisfied fully within a genuine com-
munity.13 But what kind of society does individualism prescribe for the attainment of 
its telos1. An artificial construct, to which persons are bound mechanically — the 
exact opposite of community!14 So, instead of prescribing a genuine prerequisite for 
the person's pursuit of his/her good, individualism, in Maritain's view, prescribes a 
counterfeit. Hence the contention that the approach undermines "the duty" to treat 
the person as a whole. 
Maritain sees communism as "a kind of economic theocracy;"15 he takes it to be 
committed to the view that approriate control of the productive process is the key to 
everything socially desirable. It is Maritain's opinion that this view has constrained 
communism to reduce society's principal work (society's telos) to that of controlling 
the productive process. This reduction, Maritain urges, has blinded communism to 
the goods of the person; those requirements which are necessary for the individual to 
pursue his/her good as a person.16 But, as we have seen, Maritain takes provision of 
these requirements to be part of "the duty" to treat the person as a whole. In his view 
then, communism neglects an essential aspect of this "duty". This is the main reason 
why he considers it unacceptable. 
In Maritain's view, totalitarians model society after the "biological and animal" 
kind of whole in which the constituent elements are mere parts; parts which are totally 
subservient to the whole and its telos.17 
There are at least two reasons why Maritain finds the totalitarian model unac-
ceptable. First, the model is obviously in direct conflict with his second thesis. Second, 
it constitutes an outright violation of "the duty" to treat the person as a whole which, 
as we have seen, he takes to be entailed by the same thesis. Let me elaborate. 
10. "|T]he person, as person, requires to be treated as a whole in society" (PCG, p. 58). "Whole", in the 
sense it is used in PCG, is not only opposed to "part", but also carries the Kantian sense of "end"; the 
sense of a being which ought to be cared for for its own sake. So, as a whole, i.e., as an end, a person, 
in Maritain's view, ought to be cared for not only for the sake of society, but also for his/her own sake. 
This is the essence of "the duty" to treat the person as a whole. See note #7 , PCG, pp. 17-18, and note 
#28, Ibid., pp. 49-50. Maritain refers to Kant explicitly in note #7. 
11. PCG, p. 48. 
12. Ibid., p. 47. 
13. Community seems to be necessary, in Maritain's opinion, for the kind of "dialogue in which souls really 
communicate" (PCG, p. 42). 
14. See PCG, pp. 92-93, 101. 
15. PCG, p. 96. 
16. Ibid., p. 94. 
17. Ibid., pp. 101, 50-51. 
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We have already noted that, as used in PCG, "whole" carries the Kantian sense 
of "end".18 So, for Maritain, as we have seen in the same note, qua whole in the 
sense of "end", a person ought to be cared for not merely for the sake of society but 
also for his/her own sake. As we have noted, this constitutes the essence of "the duty" 
to treat the person as a whole. But, in the totalitarian model, the person is totally 
subordinated to society and its telos. Contrary to the said "duty", s/he cannot be said 
to be cared for for his/her own sake. S/he is cared for, if ever, solely as a means for 
the attainment of society's overarching goals to which s/he is totally subordinated. It 
should be clear why the model is taken by Maritain to be an outright violation of the 
said "duty". It might be worth mentioning here that, writing in the aftermath of World 
War II, Maritain could not forget to point to the dangers inherent in totalitarianism's 
subordinationism. "Only yesterday, across the Rhine", he reminds the reader of Nazi 
Germany, "we saw to what atrocities a purely biological conception of society can 
lead."19 
Maritain's alternative candidate is intended to satisfy at least two requirements. 
First, it is meant to be society's telos as a whole, a telos that is unreducible to the 
particular goods of its constituents. In his view, as we have seen, to propose a reducible 
telos is to rob society of its holistic nature. Second, the candidate is intended to be a 
telos which incorporates the good of the person as part of its essence. The incorporation 
is meant to ensure that in pursuing the candidate, society directly intends the good 
of the person as an end, i.e., as something pursued for its own sake, not merely for 
the sake of society and its goals. In this way, the candidate is meant to secure respect 
for "the duty" to treat the person as a whole — whole in the sense of "end" — by 
an in-built sort of mechanism. It is Maritain's view, as we have seen, that, in one way 
or another, each of the other three competing approaches fails to do full justice to 
this "duty". The two requirements, I take it, are what Maritain has in mind when he 
insists that the common good should be "common to both the whole [society] and 
the parts [the individuals] into which it flows back and which, in turn, must benefit 
from it."20 
In this paper, I will not contest the validity of Maritain's two requirements. Regard-
less of how their imposition is motivated in PCG21, the requirements will be accepted 
as a reasonable tenet of a philosophical framework combining Personalism's emphasis 
of the importance of the person with the holistic-teleological, Thomistic tradition.22 
My efforts will be concentrated on characterizing Maritain's candidate succinctly. The 
reasons for the succinct characterization will be clear in the last section of the paper. 
Before presenting Maritain's candidate, I should point out two of this paper's "limi-
tations". 
18. See note #10 above. 
19. PCG, p. 68. 
20. Ibid., p. 51. 
21. Avoiding what Maritain takes to be the shortcomings of the three approaches seems to be the main motive 
for imposing the requirements in PCG. 
22. 1 have already noted (note #5 above) that "Thomistic Personalism" is Maritain's description for his position 
in PCG. 
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First, given the fact that Maritain does not use "the common good" univocally,23 
I should specify the sens with which the concept is used in this paper. My concern 
is exclusively with what he calls "the common good of civil society".24 It is his 
definition of this alone that is examined, and to which a succinct characterization is 
suggested. Second, I have not undertaken a thoroughly systematic study of Maritain's 
views on the common good. The Person And The Common Good (PCG) has been my 
major, though not exclusive, source of information. Am I for that reason presenting 
an incomplete picture of Maritain's views on the concept? I think not. Not if PCG is 
what Maritain takes it to be: "a brief and ... sufficiently clear synthesis of our position 
on a problem about which there have been numerous ... misunderstandings."251 will 
now proceed with Maritain's candidate. 
I. MARITAIN'S CANDIDATE 
To understand Maritain's candidate correctly, we will need to keep in mind that 
it is intended to satisfy two requirements: that of being society's unreducible telos, 
and that of incorporating within its essence the good of the person. But Maritain is 
not unaware that every purposive entity's good is ultimately its good existence, i.e., 
its good life. Hence, it is reasonable to think that he wants his candidate to be society's 
unreducible good life, a good life an essential component of which is the good life 
of the person. "But what is society's good life?" people are bound to ask. "In what 
does the good life of the person consist?" people will want to know. What these 
questions suggest is that, were it to be proposed in this form, the candidate would be 
too abstract to serve as a useful guide for humanity. So, Maritain sees the need to 
propose a practical equivalent to this abstract common good.26 Naturally, he identifies 
this practical equivalent with the set of all conditions necessary for society's good 
life.27 For to pursue these conditions is to pursue the abstract common good, and to 
pursue the abstract common good is to pursue these conditions. This, at any rate, 
seems to be his reasoning. But since the good life of the person is an essential component 
of his abstract common good, Maritain makes sure that his practical equivalent incor-
porates the practical equivalent to this component, i.e., the set of all conditions spe-
cifically necessary for the good life of the person. Thus, the candidate I am about to 
present turns out to be a set containing two kinds of societal elements:28 those which 
Maritain takes to be necessary for the good life of society in general, with no specific 
regard for its individual members, and those which he takes to be specifically necessary 
23. Maritain for instance opposes "the immanent common good of the universe" (PCG, pp. 17-18) to its 
"separated common good" (PCG, p. 18). Also, among other common goods, he speaks of "the uncreated 
common good of the three Divine Persons", as well as "the common good of the intellects" (PCG, p. 83). 
24. PCG, p. 54. 
25. See the "Acknowledgements" page (PCG, p. 7). 
26. Unless otherwise qualified, "the common good" will henceforth stand for this practical equivalent. 
27. It is not clear if the conditions are supposed to be sufficient for society's good life as well. 
28. In this paper, "(societal) element" is given the broadest possible extension. The only things not included 
in its extension are the individuals and society's structure. What is meant by the latter will soon be clear. 
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for the good life of the person. It might be helpful to quote the entire text of the 
candidate at this point. 
Thus, that which constitutes the common good of political society is not only: 
the collection of public commodities and services-the roads, ports, schools, etc., 
which the organization of common life presupposes; a sound fiscal condition of 
the state and its military power; the body of just laws, good customs and wise 
institutions, which provide the nation with its structure; the heritage of its great 
historical remembrances, its symbols and its glories, its living traditions and 
cultural treasures. The common good includes all these and something much more 
besides — something more profound, more concrete and more human. For it 
includes also, and above all, the whole sum itself of these; a sum which is quite 
different from a simple collection of juxtaposed units. ... It includes the sum or 
sociological integration of all the civic conscience, political virtues, and sense of 
right and liberty, of all the activity, material prosperity and spiritual riches, of 
unconsciously operative hereditary wisdom, of moral rectitude, justice, friendship, 
happiness, virtue and heroism in the individual lives of its members. For these 
things all are, in a certain measure, communicable and so revert to each member, 
helping him to perfect his life of liberty and person. They all constitute the good 
human life of the multitude.29 
The first kind of elements, it would seem, are all those included in the first 
complete sentence of the quote. For these seem to be not only the guarantors of society's 
continued existence, but also the indicators of its social, economic, cultural, and 
political health. These elements, I take it, are the ones intended to ensure the unre-
ducibility of the candidate. I am taking the second kind of elements to be all of those 
mentioned from the third occurrence of "includes" to the end of the quote. These, it 
would seem, are taken by Maritain to be of such a character that their assimilation 
by the individual is necessary, if s/he is to lead an authentically good life of the person. 
These, I take it, are the communicable ones intended to guarantee that the common 
good "includes within its essence, ... the service of the human person"30, i.e., the 
good of the person. So, assuming that its members actually play the roles ascribed to 
them, we have in Maritain's set a candidate whose very composition ensures its 
satisfying the two requirements imposed by its author. 
Do the set's members actually play the roles Maritain takes them to play? This 
is a question to which there are no easy answers. Any plausible answer calls for deep 
probing into the nature of societal and human needs, something best pursued in a 
separate paper. So, rather than pursue this issue any further, I will concentrate on 
characterizing Maritain's candidate succinctly. As I have already said, the reasons for 
the succinct characterization will be clear in the last section of the paper. 
II. MARITAIN'S CANDIDATE: A SUCCINCT SCHEMA 
From what has been said so far, Maritain's candidate would seem to be composed 
of societal elements exclusively. More precisely, If each ue" is taken to stand for a 
29. PCG, pp. 52-53. 
30. PCG, p. 29. The same is expressed in PCG, pp. 51 and 53. 
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qualifying element,31 and "n" is taken to represent the number of such elements, one 
could get the impression, from what has been said thus far, that the set Cgx exhausts 
the essence of Maritain's candidate. Cgx: {el5 e2, e3, ..., en}.32 
Is Cgx the set Maritain has in mind? I think not. As will be clear, this set constitutes 
an incomplete characterization of his candidate. I will elaborate. 
If society "needs" the elements of Cgx for its good existence, it should follow 
that it "needs" these elements' harmonious interaction as well. Nothing is desirable 
about a collection of elements if they don't actually interact harmoniously. In other 
words, as it stands, Cgx is incomplete; it leaves out the harmonious interaction between 
its elements which is an an essential prerequisite of society's good life. What is needed 
then, to complete Cgx, is a way of incorporating this lacking component into it. I take 
it that Maritain agrees with this assessment of Cgx, and that what follows is his way 
of incorporating the lacking harmony into the set. 
Maritain is not unaware that harmonious interaction between things which, like 
societal elements, have diverse tendencies cannot be expected unless they are appro-
priately organized, i.e., unless they are arranged to form a viable structure. So, he 
sees the need to give structure to the elements of the common good. This is why, I 
take it, he incorporates into his definition those things — the just laws, wise institutions, 
etc. — "which provide the nation with its structure". But not any structure will do 
for Maritain. He has in mind an appropriate kind of structure; appropriate in at least 
two ways. First, he wants a structure which is adequate for the task of integrating all 
the common good's elements in a way which ensures their desired harmonious inter-
action.33 Second, he wants this structure to be capable of ensuring the vitality of those 
elements to which he attaches central significance; elements such as justice, friendship, 
and moral goodness. Without justice and moral goodness, Maritain is convinced, the 
common good cannot be called "the good of a people", it could as well pass for the 
good "of a mob of gangsters and murderers".34 As for friendship, Maritain takes it to 
be "the very life-giving form" of the body politic.35 
To summarize, Maritain feels the need to complete Cgx by incorporating into it 
an extra component which is not a societal element, namely an appropriate kind of 
31. A qualifying element is one which is necessary either for society's good life in general, or for the specifically 
good life of the person. 
32. To simplify things, we will assume that the set constitutes an exhaustive list of all the qualifying elements. 
33. Maritain wants the elements of the common good to constitute an integrated whole. As he has told us in 
the text of the candidate, he does not see the common good as a "simple collection of juxtaposed units"; 
it is for him a "whole [integrated] sum". For another context in which Maritain stresses the character of 
the common good as an integrated whole, see Jacques MARITAIN, The Rights Of Man And Natural Law, 
trans. Doris C. Anson (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1951), p. 10. This work will henceforth be 
cited as RMNL. 
34. PCG, p. 53. See also RMNL, p. 10. 
35. Jacques MARITAIN, Man And The State (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 10th impress., 1962), p. 10. 
This work will henceforth be cited as MATS. See also RMNL, p. 36. It is Maritain's view, that of the three 
elements (justice, friendship, and moral goodness), justice stands out as "the crucial need of modern 
societies" {MATS, p. 20). See also pp. 10, 211. Again, for Maritain, justice is a function of society's 
underlying structure(s). See, for instance, MATS, pp. 23-24. 
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social structure.36 In light of this observation, I will let "st" stand for that appropriate 
kind of structure, incorporate it into Cg,, and represent Maritain's complete candidate 
for the common good as the set Cg2: {e,, e2, e3, ..., en, st}. 
But why take the trouble to characterize Maritain's candidate succinctly? Why 
make the extra effort to highlight structure as an essential component of the succinct 
characterization? These questions should be in order now that the final, succinct 
characterization of the candidate has been presented. The answer to the first question 
lies in the universal significance of Cg2, the end result of our efforts. The answer to 
the second question is to be sought in the importance of an ecclesiastical requirement 
which presupposes structure as an essential component of Cg2. As will be clear, C#2's 
significance and the said requirement are not unrelated. The latter is the result of 
universally instantiating the former to the Church's concrete situation. It is to this 
significance and to that instantiation that I am devoting the last section of this article. 
III. Cg2: SIGNIFICANCE AND ECCLESIASTICAL INSTANTIATION 
It was stated earlier on that my exclusive concern was with what Maritain calls 
the common good of civil society. In addition, it was pointed out that Maritain 
characterizes his position in PCG as Thomistic Personalism. It should, hence, not be 
amiss to say that Cg2 is a characterization of the common good of civil society within 
the Thomistic Personalist framework. But, I think, Cg2 is much more than this. As 
I will try to show, the set constitutes the schema to be followed by any attempt to 
characterize the common good, as society's telos, regardless of the attempt's philo-
sophical framework. Let me elaborate. 
To be plausible, any candidate for the common good, as society's telos should be 
"concrete", i.e., in addition to being specific in content, it should be recognizable and 
pursuable by the average person. This requirement is necessary if we are to avoid 
prescribing for humankind a telos which is bound to condemn it to either perplexity 
or purposeless endeavors. Maritain's way of concretizing his candidate, we have seen, 
consists in presenting it as a set of specific societal elements. Personally, I can think 
of no better way to accomplish this task. I am, hence, of the view that, to be plausible, 
any candidate for the common good, as society's telos will need to be expressed as a 
set of specific elements. But, just like C,g, above, any such set will be lacking the 
essential harmonious interaction between its elements, and a way will have to be 
devised to introduce this essential component. Maritain, we have observed, introduces 
the component by incorporating an appropriate kind of structure into Cgx. This, it 
appears to me, is the only viable way to introduce harmonious interaction between a 
variety of things which, like societal elements, have diverse tendencies. I am of the 
view then, that any plausible candidate for the common good, as society's telos will 
36. Following convention, 1 am taking a given society's predominant mode of ownership of the means of 
production to be the essential determinant of its social structure. On this view, we can speak of three 
possible kinds of social structures: socialism (public or collective ownership of the means of production 
predominates), capitalism (private ownership predominates), and mixed economy (socialist and capitalist 
modes exercise, more or less, the same degree of predominance). 
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need to be presented as a set of specific societal elements plus an appropriate kind 
of structure, i.e., as a set isomorphic to Cg2. This, then, is the universal significance 
of Cg2. It is the schema to be followed by any plausible attempt to characterize the 
common good, as society's telos. This is true, as I have tried to show, regardless of 
the attempt's philosophical framework. The reasons behind our efforts to reach a 
succinct characterization of the common good should now be clear. Underlying these 
efforts was the desire to spell out the universal significance of that succinct charac-
terization. Hopefully, this has been accomplished. We will now proceed to explicate 
the reasons behind our endeavors to highlight structure as an essential component of 
the succinct characterization. 
The common good, we are told by Joseph Gremillion, "forms the bedrock of 
[official] Catholic social doctrine .. .".37 It should follow from the conjunction of Cg2s 
universal significance shown above and Gremillion's observation just cited that the 
Church ought to follow schema Cg2 in its efforts to construct its social bedrock. The 
inferred requirement (henceforth requirement R{) cannot be taken lightly by the Church. 
It is the basis of an important ecclesiastical requirement. I will explain. 
It has been emphasized that an appropriate kind of structure is an essential 
component of Cg2. Combined with /?,, this position entails the requirement (henceforth 
requirement R2) that the Church incorporate an appropriate kind of structure into its 
social bedrock. R2 is an important ecclesiastical requirement. But in order to appreciate 
its importance, we should first clear one crucial problem. 
We noted above that it is conventional to speak of three possible kinds of social 
structures, namely socialism, capitalism, and "mixed economy".38 Such being the 
case, the following problem is bound to ensue: R2 requires that the Church incorporate 
an appropriate kind of structure into its bedrock. Which one of the three possible 
kinds of structures should the Church consider appropriate? Clearly, R2 does not provide 
us with any clues as to how this problem is to be tackled. My suggestion follows. 
It appears to me that the above problem cannot be handled in a purely a priori 
manner. The reason is that the world's regions in which the Church operates differ in 
a diversity of ways. Such being the case, a kind of structure which is appropriate for 
one region need not be so for another. This is the more true given the fact of extreme 
imbalances in the distribution of wealth is some regions of the world. Like Maritain, 
the Church definetely wants a social structure which is capable of ensuring the vitality 
of justice.39 It doesn't seem implausible to say that while distributive justice is likely 
to call for socialism in regions of extreme economic inequalities, capitalism might 
37. Joseph GREMILLION, The Gospel of Peace and Justice: Catholic Social Teaching Since Pope John, (Maryknoll, 
New York: Orbis Books, 1976), p. 33. Gremillion is a former Secretary for the Pontifical Commission for 
Justice and Peace. 
Even a cursary reading of the so-called aggiornamento documents confirms Gremillion's observation. See, 
for instance, Mater et Magistra: #37', #78; Pacem in Terris: #136, #138; Gaudium et Spes: #1 \; Populorum 
Progression: #23. The common good, as society's telos is clearly what is at stake in the cited texts. 
38. See note #36 above. 
39. "It [the social order] must be founded on truth, built on justice, and animated by love; in freedom it should 
grow every day toward a more humane balance." Gaudium et Spes, trans. Walter Abbot, #26d. Emphasis 
added. 
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prove to be the way to go in regions with more even economic distribution.40 It would 
seem then that the best way to tackle the problem is to proceed in an a posteriori way, 
i.e., to draw a given region's appropriate kind of structure from the nature of the 
region's concrete historical circumstances. Here, then, is the solution I am suggesting 
to the problem before us (henceforth, the solution is to be called suggestion Sg): for 
any given region, whichever one of the three kinds of structures is most attuned to 
the nature of the historical circumstances of that region, that is the kind of structure 
the Church should consider appropriate for that region. Given Sg, I can think of two 
reasons for the claim of R2s ecclesiastical importance. 
The first reason is rather theoretical; it has to do with the nature of the Church 
itself. The Church is catholic in the sense of being universally adaptable. But, in light 
of Sg above, it is this very catholicity that R2 is asking the Church to confirm. For 
given Sg, R2 must now be read as a call on the Church to introduce its bedrock 
whatever kind of social structure is most attuned to the nature of the region in which 
the Church finds itself operating. Clearly, this is a call to universal adaptability. Herein, 
then, consists the theoretical importance of R2. Given Sg, R2 is a call on the Church 
to confirm its catholicity by adapting one of its basic tenets (the common good) to 
the world's regional differences. We have an ecclesiastically valuable call in R2. 
The second reason is more practical; it has to do with the hierarchy's stance on 
the issue of contextual theologies. More specifically, 1 have in mind the former's 
treatment of Latin America's liberation theologians. 
Relying on a "Marxist analysis"41 of their societies, the liberation theologians have 
come to see the socialist kind of structure as the only alternative which can significantly 
ameliorate the predicament of the millions of their poverty-stricken compatriots.42 So, 
convinced that concrete love for the neighbor entails effective liberating action on 
behalf of the poor, the theologians have joined the impoverished in their struggle for 
a socialist kind of structure.43 This is the perspective from which they are doing 
theology. As Gustavo Gutierrez has put it, their theology consists of speaking "the 
word of the Lord to all men [and women] from that position of solidarity."44 
40. Maritain, among others, seems to be of this view. See, for instance, MATS, Chapter I, Section IV. As we 
shall see, Latin America's liberation theologians are basically saying the same thing. Their call for socialism 
is premised on the fact of the extreme economic inequalities in their region. 
41. Liberation theologians carefully dissociate themselves from Marxism as a comprehensive, materialistic 
philosophical system. They insist on their sole use of "Marxist analysis'' as the best tool for analyzing the 
dynamics of capitalist society. For details on this points, see, for instance, Jose Miguez BONINO, Doing 
Theology in a Revolutionary Situation, (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1975), pp. 96-99. 
42. Juan Luis Segundo has been very explicit on the option for socialism. For him one of the most acute human 
problems of the Latin American continent is "the option between capitalist and socialist societies". Segundo 
leaves not doubt in his reader's mind that, for him, socialism is the option for Latin America. See, Juan 
Luis SEGUNDO, "Capitalism—Socialism: A Theological Crux", in Gustavo GUTIERREZ and Claude GEEFRF. 
(eds), The Mystical and Political Dimensions of the Christian Faith (Concilium 96), (New York: Herder and 
Herder, 1974), p. 106. This book will henceforth be referred to simply as Concilium 96. 
43. Liberation theologians contrast abstract love with concrete love. The latter, they insist, entails effective 
action on behalf of the loved one. See, for instance, Gustav GUTIERREZ, A Theology of Liberation: History, 
Politics and Salvation, trans, and ed. Sister Caridad INDA and John FAGLESON, (Maryknoll, New York: 
Orbis Books, 1973), pp. 275-277. 
44. Gustav GUTIERREZ, "Liberation, Theology and Proclamation", in Concilium 96, p. 58. 
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Hierarchical reactions to liberation theology have ranged from attempts to alienate 
its propounders, to blanket condemnations.45 These reactions, it would seem, are largely 
responsible for the current tension between the hierarchy and the theologians of 
liberation.46 Are these reactions justifiable? Some of them might be justifiable, others 
might not be. I am not in a position to give a fair verdict on each individual case. All 
I want to say is that the current situation calls for an honest dialogue aimed at reconciling 
the two parties, and that there is a good basis for such a dialogue. That basis, as will 
soon be clear, is R2. 
We have already observed that, given Sg, R2 must be read as a call on the Church 
to introduce whatever social structure is most attuned to nature of the region in which 
the Church finds itself operating. For the entire Latin American Church this call entails 
a common task: the task of discerning the most suitable kind of social structure for 
the region. This is so because the Latin American Church cannot be expected to 
introduce what it does not know. How is the question of discernment to be tackled? 
This proves to be the pressing now. 
The a posteriori procedure we have advocated calls for the sort of discernment 
which draws the most suitable kind of structure for Latin America from the region's 
concrete historical circumstances. But these circumstances can be the subject of 
differring interpretations. Such being the case, different sectors of the Latin American 
Church can be expected to take opposing stances on the issue of the most suitable 
kind of structure for the region. Who is to pronounce the final verdict? No one can 
claim to be an infallible judge on an issue of this kind. The only realistic option, it 
appears to me, is for the leadership (the hierarchy) to engage all the concerned parties 
in an honest dialogue. This will give the parties a chance to critically engage each 
other's position. Hopefully, a viable compromise will ensue from this critical engage-
ment. There is, of course, no guarantee that this will happen, but the stakes are too 
45. Attemps to alienate liberation theologians as a group include the deliberate exclusion of their leading 
members from the list of the theological periti allowed to attend the Third General Conference of the Latin 
American episcopate. See Moises SANDOVAL, "Report From The Conference", in John EAGLESON and 
Philip SCHARPER (eds), trans. John Drury, Puebla And Beyond: Documentation And Commentary, (Mary-
knoll, New York: Orbis Books, 1980), p. 31. Blanket condemnations of liberation theology by high placed 
Church officials seem to dominate the scene in Latin America. This is the picture I get from reading 
MacEoin's article. MacEoin has reported that according to a survey of the leading Brazilian newspapers, 
202 of the 232 articles on liberation theology in a six-year period are condemnatory. And, as he goes on 
to say, nearly all the 202 articles are by archbishops and bishops, making stereotype "Marxist" condemnations 
of liberation theology. See Gary MACEION, "1492-1992: To bury Columbus or to praise him", National 
Catholic Reporter (NCR), September 21, 1990, pp. 11-12. To balance the picture, we will mention the 
names of some members of the Brazilian hierarchy (bishops) who are sympathetic to liberation theology. 
Paulo Evaristo Arns (Sao Paulo), Moacyr Grechi (Rio Branco, Acre), Jose Maria Pires (Joao pessoa, Paraiba), 
Mauro Morelli (Caxias), Valfriedo Tepe (Ilheus, Bahia). According to liberation theologian Leornado Boff, 
the above-mentioned are "somehow linked to liberation theology". From an interview of Boff by Deborah 
El-Dabh, NCR, March, 17, 1989, p. 26. 
46. The tension between the hierarchy and the theologians of liberation is, perhaps, best reflected by what is 
currently going on between the Vatican and the latin American Conference of Religious (CLAR). While 
the Vatican insists on imposing its agenda and leadership on CLAR, CLAR, a steadfast defender of liberation 
theology, continues to fight back the imposition. See Leslie Wirpsa, "Vatican Clampdown on CLAR 
continues", NCR, February 15, 1991, p. 14. See also, by the same author, "Latin American religious 
protest Rome actions: CLAR statement comes after two years of growing tensions", NCR, October, 11, 
1991, p. 19. 
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high to leave things to mere chance. One thing is certain, however, namely that the 
liberation theologians are one of the concerned parties which should be engaged in 
the dialogue. As we have seen, they are already committed to the struggle for what 
they honestly believe to be the most appropriate kind of structure for their region. 
It should now be easy to state /?2's practical importance. Read in light of Sg, R2 
constitutes a good basis for an honest dialogue between the hierarchy and the theo-
logians of liberation. Apart from being necessary for the correct discernment of Latin 
America's appropriate kind of social structure, the dialogue promises to constitute the 
beginnings of the desirable process of reconciliation between the two parties. 
The reader should now be in a position to see why we highlighted structure as 
an essential component of Maritain's candidate. We did this so that we could be in a 
position to deduce R2 from instantiating Cg2 to the Church's unique situation. It should 
be clear to anyone who has followed the line of reasoning in this section that 7?, is 
the result of instantiating Cg2s universal significance to the Church's situation, that 
7?, entails R2, and that the entailment does not hold without the assumption that structure 
is an integral part of Cg2. 
In conclusion, our efforts to characterize Maritain's candidate succinctly have not 
been in vain. We have seen that Cg2, the end result of our efforts, is a universally 
significant schema. We have endeavored to show Cg2's special significance for the 
Church. Its instantiation to the Church's situation, we have argued, results into /v2, 
an ecclesiastically important requirement. We have not only shown /?2's theoretical 
value, we have also demonstrated its practical fecundity.47 
47. I am very grateful to Dr. Parker English of Ball state University, Department of Philosophy. He read earlier 
versions of this paper and provided very constructive criticisms. 
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